Malaysia will formally take over the annually rotating chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in January 2025.
On the agenda is the drafting of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, the successor to the current Vision 2025 guidelines set to expire at the end of next year.
Malaysia will also have to address the burgeoning cyber-scamming industries that have flourished in parts of the region.
Meanwhile, tensions are rising between several Southeast Asian states and China over disputed territory in the South China Sea, even as Myanmar, an ASEAN member, remains engulfed in a civil war.
China’s growing involvement there is making an ASEAN-led solution seem increasingly marginal.
More challenging still, Malaysia will helm the 10-member regional bloc just before the inauguration of Donald Trump as US president on January 20.
Can the center hold?
These interlinked issues underscore the importance of maintaining ASEAN’s “cohesiveness” amid turbulent geopolitical currents. Keeping US-China tensions from spilling over further into Southeast Asia will be crucial, Bridget Welsh, an honorary research associate at the University of Nottingham Asia Research Institute Malaysia, told DW.
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim conveyed a similar sentiment during his address at the ASEAN Summit in Vientiane in October, as reported by Radio Free Asia.
“We cannot overstress the importance of dialogue and cooperation forming the fundamentals of amity and good relations,” he said. “As global tensions continue to rise, cracks and divisions within ASEAN run the risk of being exploited to the detriment of ASEAN centrality and cohesiveness.”
Prashanth Parameswaran, a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Asia Program, told DW that Malaysia is likely to be “active and outspoken” on geopolitical and economic issues during its chairmanship, given Anwar’s past vocal stances.
“We can expect Malaysia’s chairmanship year to include a focus not just on major power dynamics, but also on middle powers and other regions in line with growing attention to Global South discontent,” he added.
New leadership in Southeast Asia
A wave of new leadership across Southeast Asia could also shape Malaysia’s chairmanship of ASEAN.
Indonesia’s new president, Prabowo Subianto, took office in October. Singapore and Thailand installed new prime ministers in August and May, respectively, and Cambodia underwent a significant leadership reshuffle in 2023.
Vietnam and Laos will spend much of next year engaged in backroom discussions ahead of their respective National Congresses in early 2026.
On the one hand, given Anwar’s regional stature, these leadership changes could mean other governments show him more deference, allowing Malaysia greater leeway to steer ASEAN’s agenda. That could help if other leaders focus on domestic consolidation rather than making waves on the regional stage.
On the other hand, these changes might complicate matters. For example, Indonesia under President Subianto may want to carve out a more assertive regional role, potentially clashing with Malaysia’s priorities.
The South China Sea dilemma
Joanne Lin, a senior fellow and co-coordinator of the ASEAN Studies Centre at the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, noted Malaysia’s dual position as both a claimant state in the South China Sea and the current country coordinator for ASEAN-China relations.
This means Malaysia “has a significant stake” in advancing the Code of Conduct negotiations with Beijing, a purported peaceful means of solving ongoing disputes, which ASEAN has said it hopes to finalize by 2026.
“Malaysia will likely prioritize pushing these talks forward, emphasizing ASEAN’s collective interest in ensuring a rules-based approach to maritime disputes,” Lin said.
“However, if Malaysia is perceived as leaning too closely toward China, it may face challenges in maintaining the trust of other claimant states, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, which are more assertive in defending their territorial claims,” she added.
“Malaysia will need to carefully navigate these dynamics, addressing the security concerns of its ASEAN partners while avoiding direct confrontation with China.”
Beyond ASEAN’s Reach?
Malaysia may find it tougher to shape events in Myanmar, where a full-blown civil war eruptedafter a military coup in 2021.
ASEAN’s response, centered on the so-called Five-Point Consensus, has been widely criticized as ineffective, leaving a vacuum that outside powers, particularly China, have begun to fill.
Beijing has deepened ties with the Myanmar junta and this month forced some of the anti-junta ethnic militias to accept ceasefires.
There are concerns that China may consider putting boots on the ground, ostensibly to protect Chinese assets and citizens, thereby increasing its influence over the conflict’s trajectory.
Because of its relatively close ties with Beijing, Malaysia may be “well-positioned” to press China and the junta toward inclusive dialogue, Lin said.
However, this could also create friction within ASEAN, especially if the incoming Trump administration adopts a more confrontational approach.
Anwar’s government has grown more distant from the West over the past year. He has twice met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and has refrained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Anwar has frequently accused Western governments of “double standards” concerning their support for Israel’s actions in Gaza and Lebanon.
All these factors increase the complexity of Malaysia’s upcoming chairmanship. “ASEAN is already moving towards China and this creates some tensions within the organization,” Welsh observed.
Edited by: Wesley Rahn
