Why Expired Sanctions Are Not a Victory—and Why Engagement Still Matters
1. The Myth of “Lifting Sanctions”
For nearly five years, U.S. policy toward Eritrea has been filtered through the prism of Ethiopia—specifically the Tigray war. When the Biden administration issued Executive Order 14046 in September 2021, it declared the situation “in and around northern Ethiopia” a national emergency. The sanctions that followed were narrowly constructed: they targeted Eritrean individuals and institutions Washington believed were directly implicated in atrocities, obstruction of humanitarian access, and the prolongation of the conflict.
In practice, the United States designated the Eritrean Defense Forces, the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, the Red Sea Trading Corporation, and the Hidri Trust. It also sanctioned two senior officials: Abraha Kassa, longtime head of the National Security Office, and Hagos Ghebrehiwet (Kisha), the PFDJ’s economic chief and CEO of Red Sea Trading Corporation. These were not sanctions on Eritrea as a state, nor a judgment on its internal governance. They were a legal response to a specific crisis in Tigray.
This pattern echoes the UN sanctions imposed in 2010 under Security Council Resolution 1907. Those measures were likewise tied to regional conflict—allegations that Eritrea was playing a spoiler role in Somalia and refusing to withdraw troops from Djibouti’s border. Whether those claims were accurate, exaggerated, or politically weaponized, the essential point is clear: both the UN sanctions and the U.S. sanctions were reactions to regional crises, not expressions of hostility toward the Eritrean people or Eritrea’s domestic politics.
This raises a question Eritreans—especially regime loyalists—must confront honestly: Why does Eritrea repeatedly entangle itself in conflicts that have nothing to do with its national interest? Why interfere in Somalia? Why intervene in Tigray? Why must ordinary citizens bear the cost of sanctions, isolation, and reputational damage for decisions made without transparency or national consensus?
For fifteen years, Eritreans lived under sanctions regimes that were never about Eritrea’s internal affairs, yet they suffered the consequences all the same. The pattern is unmistakable: Eritrea is sanctioned not for who it is, but for where its leaders choose to involve the country. And those entanglements—Somalia (2006–2009), Djibouti (2008), Tigray (2020–2022)—were neither inevitable nor strategically beneficial. They were choices. And choices have consequences.
This is precisely why the expiration of EO 14046 matters. The Eritrean regime has long weaponized sanctions—UN or U.S.—as one of its most potent propaganda tools, a convenient arsenal of excuses to keep the public fearful, isolated, and politically anesthetized. For years, Eritreans were told that the world was conspiring against them, that external enemies were plotting to destroy their nation, and that only vigilance, sacrifice, and silence could protect the homeland. Sanctions became the regime’s psychological infrastructure: a permanent state of emergency, a justification for repression, and a narrative that demanded obedience.
But that narrative is collapsing. The UN Security Council terminated Resolution 1907 on November 14, 2018, ending the sanctions tied to Eritrea’s alleged role in Somalia and the Djibouti crisis. And now, with the expiration of EO 14046, the U.S. sanctions regime has also ended. For the first time in fifteen years, Eritrea is sanction‑free.
This moment strips away one of the regime’s central bogeymen. It forces a reckoning with a question the government has never allowed the public to ask openly: Why were Eritreans subjected to sanctions for conflicts that had nothing to do with Eritrea’s national interest? Why did Eritrea need to interfere in Somalia? Why did it need to intervene in Tigray? Why must ordinary citizens bear the cost of decisions made without transparency, accountability, or national debate?
The expiration of EO 14046 does more than remove a legal instrument—it removes a political crutch. It exposes the regime’s long‑standing habit of entangling Eritrea in regional conflicts and then blaming the world for the consequences. And it leaves the government with one less excuse to justify the siege mentality it has imposed on its own people.
For those who advocate responsible, meaningful, and positive change in Eritrea, this is a welcome development. The regime has lost one of its most effective narratives of victimhood. The fog of perpetual external threat has thinned. The Eritrean people deserve clarity, not fear; engagement, not isolation; and truth, not manufactured siege.
This distinction is essential today, as the Trump administration has allowed the Ethiopia‑related emergency to expire. Legally, the sanctions were not “lifted”—they expired automatically because the statutory authority behind them lapsed. OFAC’s removal of Eritrean entities from the SDN list was a procedural consequence, not a diplomatic reward, not a policy reversal, and certainly not a vindication of the regime’s conduct.
2. Propaganda and Political Theater
Despite this, the Eritrean government and its media ecosystem have rushed to frame the expiration as a triumphant “lifting of sanctions,” a narrative designed to confuse the public and claim victory where none exists. Even reputable outlets have contributed to the confusion: Middle East Eye incorrectly framed the development as “US lifts sanctions on Eritrea with Red Sea in focus,” while Reuters misleadingly titled its report “US removes sanctions on Eritrean Defense Force.” Aljezera English has a tiltle, “US lifts sanctions on Eritrea ‘to advance US regional interests’ in Red Sea.” These are not mere semantic errors—they distort the legal reality and feed Asmera’s propaganda machine.
Berhane Gebrehiwet, Eritrea’s chargé d’affaires in Washington, went so far as to congratulate the people and government of Eritrea “for their steadfastness, resilience, and principled approach that made this development a reality.” He condemned the Biden administration for “unilateral sanctions imposed on Eritrea” and praised the Trump administration’s “corrective measures.”
He concluded with an optimistic note: “Today’s move by the US should mark the beginning of a new chapter in the Eritrea-US relations… grounded in sovereign respect, mutual interests, and the pursuit of a mutually beneficial partnership.”
The last part is precisely where I agree. But the rest is political theater. Washington did not change its view of Eritrea; it simply allowed a time‑bound emergency to run its course.
3. A Consistent Call for Engagement
If anything, the expiration confirms arguments I have made consistently for years.
In Re‑engaging Eritrea: A Path Beyond the Stalemate, I argued that sanctions, targeted as they maybe, are blunt instruments—particularly against states like Eritrea that are structurally insulated from external pressure. Sanctions neither changed Asmera’s behavior nor advanced U.S. interests. They hardened Eritrea’s suspicion, deepened its isolation, and left Washington without meaningful leverage.
In Why U.S.–Eritrea Normalization Keeps Failing, I explained why punitive approaches repeatedly collapse: Washington oscillates between moral condemnation and strategic neglect, while Eritrea responds with defensiveness and silence. The result is a stalemate in which neither side gets what it wants—security for the United States, sovereignty and respect for Eritrea.
The expiration of EO 14046 reflects a broader strategic shift in U.S. priorities—one that aligns with the engagement‑first approach I have long advocated.
4. The Red Sea Has Rewritten the Strategic Map
The Tigray war is over, but the region remains dangerously fragile. The news that is coming is very concerning. The past year has seen repeated flareups:
- Jan–Feb 2026: Tigrayan forces crossed the Tekeze River into the contested Tselemti district, triggering skirmishes and disrupting Ethiopian Airlines flights.
- May 2026: The TPLF reinstated a pre‑war regional government structure, sidelining the federal‑backed interim administration.
- Aug 1–2, 2026: Heavy fighting erupted in Shererina (Western Tigray), with artillery and reported drone strikes near the Sudanese border.
- Mid‑Aug 2026: Drone activity near Mekelle and Mora sent hundreds fleeing toward Sudan.
- Sept 2026: Roughly 300 Tigrayan fighters surrendered in Addis Ababa amid fears of renewed conflict.
The humanitarian catastrophe, while still painful, is no longer the central organizing principle of U.S. policy. But the ingredients for another war remain fully intact. The alliances have shifted: Tigrayan forces are now aligned with Eritrea, and any future conflict could draw in anti‑federal Ethiopian groups, Eritrea, and Sudan. The likelihood of a regional conflagration is high. The United States must walk carefully in this mine‑filled landscape.
Meanwhile, the Red Sea has become a theater of escalating tension—Houthi attacks on shipping, Iranian influence, Gulf rivalries, and great‑power competition. Eritrea’s geography—commanding the northern entrance to the Bab el‑Mandeb—makes it indispensable to any serious maritime security strategy.
Washington has quietly begun recalibrating.
5. Eritrea’s Regional Outreach: The Saudi Connection
Eritrea’s recent high‑level delegation to Saudi Arabia—led by Hagos Ghebrehiwet (formerly sanctioned under Biden’s proclamation) and Nesredin Mohammed Saleh, Minister of Trade and Industry—signals Asmera’s interest in economic integration and Foreign Direct Investments.
Their meetings with Waleed Alkhereiji, Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, reportedly focused on:
- strengthening bilateral cooperation
- expanding ties across multiple sectors
- exploring investment opportunities
The presence of Berhane Gebrehiwot, CEO of the Housing and Commercial Bank of Eritrea, underscores that Eritrea is seeking capital, partnerships, and regional economic relevance.
This is precisely where the United States has an opportunity. Washington can leverage its close relationships with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf partners to encourage Eritrea’s regional integration—through investment, infrastructure, trade, and maritime cooperation.
6. Quiet Diplomacy: Massad Boulos’s Cairo Meetings
This regional diplomacy is not occurring in isolation. Over the past year, U.S. Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos has met multiple times in Cairo with the foreign ministers of Egypt and Eritrea, holding separate discussions aimed at exploring avenues for stability, maritime security, and regional coordination.
These repeated meetings—quiet, discreet, and strategically timed—reflect Washington’s recognition that Eritrea cannot be ignored in any serious Red Sea strategy. They also show that the United States is already experimenting with indirect engagement through regional partners, especially Egypt, whose longstanding security ties with Eritrea and confrontation with Ethiopia over the GERD give it unique leverage. But as significant as the Egyptian‑Eritrean relationship is, the real game changer lies in the Saudi angle—and that is where U.S. influence is strongest. Riyadh’s economic weight, its expanding Red Sea ambitions, and its deep partnership with Washington make Saudi Arabia the most consequential regional actor capable of nudging Eritrea toward integration, stability, and economic openness.
7. The Case for Direct U.S.–Eritrea Engagement
Regional incentives alone are not enough. The United States needs to directly engage Eritrea and restore diplomatic exchanges at the ambassadorial level.
Eritrea is one of the few countries where Washington has operated with a chargé d’affaires for more than a decade. This prolonged absence of high‑level diplomatic representation has deprived the United States of insight, influence, and credibility. It has left Washington navigating Eritrea through second‑hand information, limited access, and episodic engagement—an approach wholly inadequate for a country sitting on one of the most strategically sensitive coastlines in the world.
Restoring ambassadorial‑level diplomacy would not legitimize the regime; it would simply allow the United States to pursue its interests with clarity and seriousness. An ambassador provides access, intelligence, and diplomatic bandwidth that a chargé d’affaires cannot. It signals commitment rather than neglect, strategy rather than improvisation.
The United States also has an underutilized asset: the diverse Eritrean‑American community, composed of both pro‑government and opposition voices. Engaging this diaspora—professionals, scholars, civic leaders, and former refugees who understand both societies intimately—would help foster a more holistic approach and rebuild a bridge that has been missing for decades. They can serve as cultural interpreters, policy connectors, and credible intermediaries capable of lowering mistrust and widening channels of communication. In a relationship long defined by silence, suspicion, and missed opportunities, this community remains one of the few resources capable of generating genuine people‑to‑people engagement.
Engagement is not appeasement. It is recognition that the Horn of Africa—and the Red Sea corridor in particular—requires pragmatic diplomacy, not symbolic punishment.
8. A Moment of Opportunity—If Washington Seizes It
The United States gains nothing by keeping Eritrea in a penalty box. Eritrea gains nothing by celebrating procedural expirations as geopolitical triumphs. Real work lies in building a relationship grounded in interests, not illusions.
The expiration of EO 14046 is not a victory for the Eritrean regime. It is an opportunity for the United States to finally pursue the engagement strategy that has been overdue for years—one that I have consistently argued is in the national interest of both countries.
Whether Washington seizes this moment will determine the trajectory of the next decade in the Red Sea. And when it does, Eritrea must be prepared to reciprocate—not with slogans or symbolic gestures, but with the seriousness, openness, and strategic maturity that genuine partnership requires.
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