China’s tariff announcement and the African response
In February 2026, China announced that 53 African countries can now sell their goods to China without paying any import taxes. This new rule starts on May 1. President Xi Jinping sent a message about this to African leaders at the African Union summit in Ethiopia. He said China made this choice because global trade is splitting up, and China wants to do more business with Africa.
The head of the African Union, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, supported the idea. He said the plan came at the perfect time because African economies are struggling right now. Many other African leaders agreed. They saw this as a great chance to sell more goods to China, which has the second-biggest economy in the world. However, the new rule left out one African country.
That single country is Eswatini. Missing out on this massive trade deal is about more than just business. It shows that getting economic perks from China can depend on whether you take the right political side, even in programs that are supposed to be open to everyone.
Keep up with the latest headlines on WhatsApp | LinkedIn
Eswatini is a small country with about 1.3 million people, tucked right between South Africa and Mozambique. It was the only African nation left off China’s new trade list. Today, it is the last country in Africa that still chooses to have an official relationship with Taiwan. Beijing views Taiwan as part of its own territory. Because of this, Beijing tells other countries they must agree to its ‘One China’ rule if they want to do official business together. By leaving Eswatini out, China shows everyone how it connects its business deals to its political rules.
How China framed the non-interference narrative
For a long time, China has said that its help to African countries comes with no strings attached. Since starting a big China-Africa group in 2000, Beijing has focused on growing trade, building roads, and lending money without telling African leaders how to run their countries.
At a major meeting in 2013, Xi said that China would help Africa grow without demanding any political favours. In 2018, China called this promise the ‘Five Nos’. This meant that China would not get involved in Africa’s local choices, would not mess with its internal affairs, and would not force its will on anyone. It also meant that China’s money and loans were not a trick to buy political power. These promises have helped China build strong friendships across Africa. They also make China look very different from Western countries, whose aid often comes with a lot of rules.But the Eswatini story shows that if a country wants China’s best business deals, it must agree with the PRC’s political rules. To get the tax-free trade deal, a country has to choose Beijing over Taiwan. From China’s point of view, this is just how they protect their own power abroad. Still, a closer look proves that money and politics are always linked, even in deals that promise to have no strings attached. This would not be the first time we have seen a gap between what China says and what China actually does in Africa.
Foreign policy position of Eswatini
Eswatini has made a very clear choice in this global battle. Its leaders have stuck with Taiwan, even though China has put a lot of pressure on them to switch sides.
In May 2026, Taiwan’s President, Lai Ching-te, visited Eswatini. This happened after three African countries that side with China refused to let his plane fly through their airspace. During the visit, King Mswati III promised to keep supporting Taiwan, saying his country wants to help Taiwan get recognised by the rest of the world. Before this trip, Eswatini’s Deputy Prime Minister also went to Taiwan to show everyone that their friendship is still going strong. China was not happy about these meetings. They complained about the visits and refused to back down, saying that having official ties with Taiwan breaks the ‘One China’ policy.
Costs of diplomatic choice
This stance hurts Eswatini economically rather than threatening its safety. Eswatini is a small, landlocked country with little industry, and it relies heavily on outside funding to build its roads and infrastructure. Missing out on China’s tax-free trade deal hurts its businesses, especially now when special trade access is crucial for African countries trying to sell new products abroad.
At the same time, Eswatini is choosing this path, not just being forced into it. Its decision to stick with Taiwan comes from a long friendship that started well before China became a major economic power in Africa. Eswatini has held onto this choice, even though China’s growing wealth on the continent offers strong reasons to switch sides. Other African governments have stayed quiet about Eswatini being left out. The African Union refused to say much publicly, even though the policy was announced at its own headquarters and directly impacts one of its member states.
A few major reasons explain this quiet reaction. China is a vital economic partner for most African nations – it is the continent’s biggest single trading partner and a massive source of funding for roads and infrastructure. For these governments, keeping a good relationship with Beijing is necessary to hit their own development goals at home.
On top of that, China-Africa deals happen mostly behind closed doors between top leaders. Projects like infrastructure, loans, and trade deals are usually negotiated quietly by governments without much public information. This leaves little room for the public to debate sensitive diplomatic decisions.
Finally, most African countries are not affected in any way by Eswatini being left out. Because nearly all of them recognize Beijing instead of Taipei, they still get the tax-free trade perks. This gives them very little reason to band together and protest. Together, these factors mean that sensitive political issues between China and Africa are handled behind closed doors through diplomacy, in place of open public debate.
Conclusions
The meaning of excluding Eswatini goes beyond the rules of trade. It highlights how access to economic perks can be handed out based on political loyalty, even within programs that claim to include everyone.
China has always pitched its work in Africa as a partnership with ‘no strings attached’. This idea has been popular because it offers an alternative to Western aid, which often requires local governments to make political or legal reforms first.
Yet, this tax-free deal proves that political rules still matter deeply whenever the PRC’s core claims on sovereignty are involved. It’s not that there are no conditions, it is that the conditions are focused entirely on specific strategic goals. The real question now is whether China mixes economics and politics, as most major powers do. The real issue is how these political rules are applied and how they create unequal treatment inside regional groups.
Sign up for free AllAfrica Newsletters
Get the latest in African news delivered straight to your inbox
The case of Eswatini makes this reality even more visible. It shows that taking part in Africa-wide economic deals can be decided by outside diplomatic battles that have nothing to do with economics. It also raises a bigger problem for Africa. Can continental groups like the African Union effectively protect all their member states when powerful outside partners treat those members differently?
This situation does not in any way erase the value of China as a major economic partner for Africa, nor does it mean the PRC is always being pushy. Instead, it points to a more complicated reality where business and global politics run side-by-side, sometimes helping each other and sometimes getting in each other’s way.
For leaders within the continent, the main issue is whether African nations can work together to set the terms of these major trade deals themselves. Looking at Eswatini, it makes that question impossible to ignore.
Francis Annagu is a freelance journalist and researcher specialising in political and economic affairs between Greater China and Africa. A fellow of the Tiger Eye Foundation and Code for Africa, he has received grants from the Pulitzer Center, the Rainforest Journalism Fund, and the Africa-China Reporting Project. His writing has appeared in the Global Taiwan Institute, Independent Australia, and the Taiwan Policy Center, among others.
