Bereket Mekonnen
Over a week ago, the Eritrean government announced the passing of former Ambassador and Minister of Education Semere Russom in its standard, formulaic fashion: a senior official succumbs to illness, followed by a summary of their revolutionary service in the EPLF, their ministerial portfolio, and details of their funeral and surviving family.
What makes Semere Russom’s official obituary unusual, however, is the blatant falsehood embedded near the end. State media claimed that he served as “Minister of Education from 2006 to 2018 and simultaneously as Minister of Education and Ambassador to Ethiopia from 2018 to 2025.” That claim is politically absurd. In Eritrea’s history of governance since independence, juggling multiple high-level portfolios is a rarity. A rare exception occurred in 2005 when the late Finance Minister Berhane Abrehe represented Eritrea at the UN General Assembly following the death of Foreign Minister Ali Said Abdella, who was scheduled to represent Eritrea at the time.
In reality, when Semere Russom was appointed Ambassador to Ethiopia in 2018, it created a structural vacancy at the Ministry of Education. Petros Hailemariam stepped in as interim minister of education, serving until earlier this year when Dr. Halima Mohammed was officially (and unusually discretely) named to the post by state media.
What the government brazenly attempted to rewrite is the factual end of Semere Russom’s career in Eritrean politics. His active tenure in government effectively ended in 2022 due to severe health issues, reportedly linked to Alzheimer’s disease. For his final years, he remained confined to his home under the care of his family as his conditions declined. In doing so, Semere Russom joined an increasingly growing cohort within Asmara’s aging and dying power structure—the likes of Sebhat Efrem, Zemehret Yohannes, the late Ahmed Baduri and Woldenkiel Abraha. These men belong to a distinct category: figures who were neither formally “frozen” nor forcibly “disappeared,” but whose physical or cognitive incapacity quietly removed them from the political stage. The Eritrean government’s clumsy attempt to airbrush Semere’s multi-year absence reveals a regime increasingly desperate to project continuity while its core leadership steadily decays from within.
Even if the Eritrean government’s statement that the late Semere Russom simultaneously managed a diplomatic mission and a cabinet portfolio had any merit, it exposes a systemic failure within the PFDJ: the regime’s complete inability to cultivate or entrust power to a new generation. Decades into statehood, governance at the highest echelons remains frozen in the hands of an aging revolutionary vanguard, leaving key institutions reliant on a shrinking circle of octogenarians.
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This policy of intentional non-replacement (or delayed replacement of ministerial roles) has created a staggering institutional void within PFDJ. Glaring examples are the posts of Party Secretary, remaining vacant for the past 5 years since the passing of Alamin Mohammed Said. Regardless of how much weight the role holds or whether its a role that wields influence in governance or is purely symbolic, it shows that the government has been hollowed out. The trend for the last decade is that rather than appointing a successor, the position is “temporarily” (a word I would like to use loosely) assigned to overworked caretakers that often served as subordinates to ministers or is quietly absorbed into the office of the Presidency (such as the Ministry of Defense).
What makes this paralysis particularly volatile is that it no longer can be ignored, even by the regime’s most devoted base. In private conversations within PFDJ-centered communities in the diaspora, inside the country, and in increasingly tense debates across pro-government online spaces such as X and Reddit, loyalists are quietly voicing the same anxious question: Who comes next?
Ultimately, the decision to embellish Semere Russom’s obituary appears calculated. By fabricating a continuous dual portfolio up until his passing, the Eritrean government attempted to paper over its sprawling ministerial vacancies and mask a mounting institutional crisis. Above all, this false narrative was designed to deflect from an inescapable question echoing loudly across online forums and private conversations within the Eritrean diaspora and even Eritreans inside the country behind closed doors: What is Eritrea’s plan for a transition of power?
This resort to posthumous revisionism is not an isolated propaganda misstep; it is a symptom of a government running out of operational figures. For decades, President Isaias Afwerki has relied on a tight-knit cadre of veteran fighters from the liberation war to hold the levers of state power. But as nature takes its course, these aging loyalists are passing away without a viable second tier of civilian leadership to replace them. Rather than appointing new ministers or building sustainable administrative structures, the regime has opted for a phantom cabinet, recycling the names of the deceased or incapacitated to project an illusion of continuity.
This strategy of deliberate deception exposes the profound void at the heart of the state apparatus. By refusing to delegate real authority to a younger generation, the regime has effectively paralyzed its own bureaucracy. State organs function in a permanent holding pattern, operating without clear mandates, institutional autonomy, or designated lines of succession. The fabrication of official records is an attempt to conceal a grim reality: the government is hollowed out, existing primarily as a shell designed to serve the singular authority of the president.
In the coming months and years, the rhythm of official state eulogies will only accelerate as time claims the remaining members of the old guard, whether they are still serving as a minister or have been discretely retired for health reasons. The state media’s clumsy attempts to fabricate active roles for dying government officials and army commanders cannot hide the ultimate crisis facing the nation. By personalizing power and destroying every formal institution capable of managing a succession, Isaias Afwerki has tied the survival of the Eritrean state entirely to his own mortality.
As writer and analyst Semere Habtemariam has repeatedly warned, the only viable exit from this downward spiral requires the ruling PFDJ to confront reality before nature decides for them. It is in the party’s absolute best interest to convene an official congress, not next year, not when conditions feel ideal, but immediately. The situation has reached a critical threshold, and without an urgent, structured framework for transition, Isaias Afwerki’s inevitable passing will not just mark the end of an era but leave Eritrea teetering on the edge of collapse.
