The High Court (General Jurisdiction 10) in Accra, presided over by Justice John Eugene Nyadu Nyante, has ruled that the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) does not have the constitutional authority to independently prosecute criminal cases, directing the Attorney-General to take over all such prosecutions.
The decision, described by observers as a landmark ruling, was delivered on Wednesday, April 15, 2026 in a suit titled The Republic vs. The Office of the Special Prosecutor, brought by Peter Archibald Hyde.
In its ruling, the court held that although the OSP has the legal mandate to investigate corruption-related offences, it lacks the constitutional backing to initiate and conduct prosecutions independently.
The court relied on Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution, which vests prosecutorial authority solely in the Attorney-General.
Consequently, the court ordered the Attorney-General’s office to assume responsibility for cases currently being prosecuted by the anti-corruption body.
The ruling has triggered widespread public debate, with notable reactions from governance expert Henry Kwesi Prempeh.
In a social media post, Prof. Prempeh advised the Special Prosecutor, Kissi Agyebeng, to remain calm and refrain from appealing the decision or engaging in public disputes over the matter.
However, the Office of the Special Prosecutor has strongly pushed back against the ruling. Sammy Darko, Director of Strategy, Research and Communication at the OSP, initially described reports of the decision as false.
Shortly after, the OSP issued an official statement indicating it would challenge the High Court’s decision, arguing that the ruling raises significant constitutional concerns.
The anti-corruption body also pointed out conflicting judicial decisions emerging from related proceedings in the ongoing Republic v. Issah Seidu & 3 Others case, popularly known as the “Rice Scandal Case.”
While the High Court (Criminal Division) dismissed an application to strike out the case and adjourned proceedings pending a determination by the Supreme Court, the General Jurisdiction court took a different position.
According to the OSP, the General Jurisdiction court declined its request to adjourn proceedings and instead ruled that the office lacks prosecutorial authority, directing that the case be handled by the Attorney-General.
The OSP maintains that the High Court does not have the jurisdiction to declare provisions of an Act of Parliament unconstitutional, insisting that only the Supreme Court has such authority.
It further assured the public that all prosecutions initiated under the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959), remain valid and will proceed unless and until the Supreme Court rules otherwise.
Other commentators on this development had argued that the High Court decision sets the stage for a major constitutional interpretation battle at the Supreme Court, which is expected to provide final clarity on the prosecutorial mandate of the OSP.
Prof. Kweku Azar’s reaction
Prof. Kweku Azar reacted to the ruling by posting on his facebook wall: My learned friend, Yaw Twumasi, asks a “very simple question” as follows:
“Section 4(2) of OSP Act reads as follows:
“Subject to clause (4) o f article 88 of the Constitution, the Office shall for the purposes of this Act be authorised by the Attorney-General to initiate and conduct the prosecution of corruption and corruption-related offences.”
The phrase “shall for the purposes of this Act be authorised by the Attorney-General”, is not the same as the phrase “for the purposes of this Act has the authority or authorisation of the Attorney-General.”
The Judge is not wrong to enforce the express provision of the OSP Act.
Was there authorisation or not?”
GOGO provides a simple 10-point answer below:
- The Question Is Not That Simple. Your argument reduces Section 4(2) to a binary was there authorisation or not?
That framing is misleading because it ignores how authorisation operates under the Constitution.
- Section 4(2) Creates Standing Authorisation, Not Case-by-Case Permission. It provides that the Office “shall… be authorised by the Attorney-General” to prosecute specified offences, subject to Article 88(4).
That is not a requirement for individual, case-by-case consent. It is a statutory mechanism of authorisation.
Parliament has defined (a) the class of cases (corruption and related offences), (b) the institution (the OSP) and (c) the mode of authorisation (by law, not by ad hoc approval).
Authorisation is embedded in the statute itself!!!
- “In Accordance with Any Law” Does the Work. Article 88(4) permits prosecutions by persons authorised by the Attorney-General “in accordance with ANY law.”
That phrase is decisive. It means (i) authorisation need not be personal, (ii) authorisation need not be case-specific, (iii) authorisation may be structured by legislation
Section 4(2) of the OSP Act is precisely such a law.
- Your Reading Confuses Form with Function. I’m presuming Judge Nyame read it that way too. If not I’d be interested to know his rationale.
The distinction between “shall be authorised” and “has authority” is formal, not substantive.
The real question is what form of authorization does the Constitution permit?
Once Article 88(4) allows authorization “in accordance with any law,” Parliament is entitled to replace ad hoc authorization with standing, institutional authorization.
To insist on repeated, case-by-case approval is to reintroduce discretion where the law has deliberately structured it.
- The System Already Works This Way. Our practices confirm this.
Under the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, the Attorney-General may appoint public prosecutors generally, by class, or for particular matters.
Acting on that authority, successive Attorneys-General have issued Executive Instruments, a form of law, designating institutional prosecutors, including officers within bodies such as SSNIT and revenue agencies, to prosecute offences arising within their statutory domains.
No one understands these arrangements to require (a) the Attorney-General’s personal approval in each case, or (b) a fresh authorization for every prosecution.
The authorization operates generally and prospectively, not episodically.
- Delegation Does Not Undermine the Constitution. It follows that when the Attorney-General authorizes prosecutors through Executive Instruments or statutory frameworks, he is not undermining the Constitution. He is acting within it.
The Constitution vests prosecutorial authority in the Attorney-General, but it does not require that authority to be personally exercised in every instance. It permits that authority to be delegated, structured, and operationalised through law.
Indeed, a contrary view would produce an untenable result: The Attorney-General would be said to violate the Constitution every time he exercises the very power of authorization the Constitution expressly confers.
That cannot be right. In fact, that is absurd. No common law supports it.Delegation, whether through Executive Instrument or statute, is not a departure from Article 88. It is the means by which Article 88 is made to function in practice.
- The Same Logic Applies to the OSP. Section 4(2) adopts this same logic, but at a higher level of structure.
Instead of relying on Executive Instruments, Parliament itself defines the institution (OSP), the scope of offences, and the framework of authorization.
It replaces piecemeal authorization with statutory authorization. That is not a constitutional defect. It is a constitutional design.
- Your Position is a Structural Contradiction. You and Judge Nyame claim that (a) every OSP prosecution requires fresh Attorney-General approval, including cases where the Attorney-General is implicated
That yields a veto over accountability. No constitutional system is designed that way. No Constitution should be mutilated that way.
- The Right Question is not “Was there authorization?” It is “Has Parliament validly structured authorization under Article 88(4)?”If the answer is yes, then authorization exists by operation of law.
- GOGO’s take is that Section 4(2) does not require the Attorney-General to sign off on each prosecution.It establishes a standing framework of authorization consistent with Article 88(4).
To read it otherwise is to (a) misread the Constitution, (b) collapse institutional design into personal control, and (c) convert a system of structured authority into one of discretionary veto.
Your question is not simple. But the answer is.
PS: Yɛde post no bɛto hɔ. Yɛnyɛ comprehension consultants.
Da Yie!
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