By Mohamed Abdirizak Mohamud, the former minister of foreign affairs of Somalia
Somalia is once again debating sovereignty—but not yet confronting the harder question: who exercises power, and on what terms?
When Somali leaders speak of sovereignty, they are not merely describing authority or territory. They are defining the terms of coexistence in a society that has never accepted domination and has repeatedly resisted it.
That instinct is not rhetorical. It is historical. For centuries, Somali society was governed through a decentralized system often described as pastoral democracy, where authority was rooted in lineage and exercised through elders, and where decisions emerged through deliberation and consensus rather than imposition. In such a system, domination is not simply unpopular; it is incompatible.
Somalia’s modern political crises cannot be understood without this foundation.
The Lesson of Collapse
The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 was not sudden, nor accidental. It marked the endpoint of a long deterioration in which political exclusion, coercion, and centralization steadily eroded legitimacy.
The failed 1978 coup and the regime’s reprisals against entire communities fractured the social contract and accelerated the rise of armed opposition. By the late 1980s, roughly a dozen clan-based movements had emerged, initially mobilizing to resist domination and defend their communities. Together, they escalated into a nationwide revolt that brought down the regime in 1991. Yet they entered that moment without a shared national political project. What began as a collective struggle quickly devolved into competition for power. Alliances collapsed, factions turned on one another, and the country descended into violent fragmentation.
This failure to move from resistance to a coherent, inclusive political order is not a distant lesson. It is a direct indictment of political leadership, past and present. Without consensus, restraint, and a genuinely shared national vision, today’s leaders are not preventing repetition; they are steering the country back toward it, this time from within the system itself.
By 1991, the state had already hollowed out.
Political Responses to Domination
What followed was not random disorder. It was a structured political response. Across the country, different regions pursued different paths, but with a shared objective: to avoid domination. Somaliland chose separation. Puntland rejected both secession and centralization, articulating an early federal vision. Others, including Galmudug and Southwest, emerged through local political processes shaped by security and historical claims.
These trajectories differed in form but converged on a single conclusion: Somalia cannot be governed through centralized imposition. Federalism did not emerge as a theory. It emerged as a compromise.
An Uneven Federal Foundation
Somalia’s federal system was not built from a single design. It was assembled from different political realities. Some states emerged through negotiation and local consensus. Others were shaped by security imperatives, external involvement, or accelerated processes with limited buy-in. Yet all were placed within a framework that assumes symmetry.
This contradiction remains unresolved. Federalism is not failing because it is flawed. It is under strain because its foundations are uneven and its development incomplete.
A System Without Guardrails
The Provisional Constitution outlines a federal order built on cooperation, consultation, and mutual respect, not unilateral control. It assigns core national functions to the federal level while anticipating negotiated relationships with the states (Articles 50–54).
Crucially, it prioritizes political coordination before legal confrontation. Article 111F provides for an Inter-State Commission to mediate disputes between the Federal Government and Federal Member States. In practice, this mechanism remains largely dormant.
The result is a system without functioning guardrails. Federal authorities extend their reach beyond agreed domains, while member states assert autonomy without consistent accountability. Disputes are settled through power rather than process.
This is not a stable equilibrium. It is a contested space.
The Deeper Contradiction
The pressure on federalism today is not one-sided. At the national level, efforts to centralize authority—often justified in the name of coherence—risk repeating a familiar mistake. Authority imposed without consensus produces resistance, not stability.
At the state level, many who resist federal overreach reproduce similar patterns internally: concentrating power, extending mandates, and limiting inclusion. Federalism cannot be defended in principle and undermined in practice. It must function both between the center and the states, and within the states themselves.
Geopolitics and a Familiar Risk
There are external echoes that should not be ignored. Just as Cold War alignments once distorted Somalia’s internal balance, today’s shifting geopolitics risk doing the same—through security partnerships, military support, and growing competition over strategic assets and natural resources. These engagements may strengthen the state in the short term, but when pursued without broad domestic consensus, they quietly reshape internal power and deepen political asymmetries.
The lesson is not that Somalia should avoid external partnerships; they are necessary. It is that external alignment cannot substitute for internal legitimacy. When military capacity, financial support, or resource agreements are concentrated without political consensus, they do not consolidate the state—they tilt it. And when power is seen as externally reinforced rather than internally negotiated, trust erodes and political competition hardens.
Somalia has seen this before. External support can sustain a government, but it cannot stabilize a political order that lacks consensus. When that distinction is ignored, external engagement does not prevent fragmentation—it accelerates it.
An Unfinished Settlement
Somalia’s federal system remains incomplete. Core questions of power-sharing, resource allocation, security arrangements, and constitutional finalization are still unresolved. These are political settlements that require negotiation, trust, and time.
They cannot be imposed or accelerated to suit political timelines.Without resolution, federalism remains contested rather than consolidated.
The Choice Ahead
Somalia does not face a choice between federalism and centralization. That debate has already been settled by history. The real choice is simpler, and harder: Will unity be built through consensus or imposed through control?
One path is slower and more demanding. The other is faster and ultimately destabilizing. Somalia has already tested both.
Conclusion
Somalis do not reject the state.They reject domination.
Federalism, however imperfect, is the political expression of that reality. It is not a temporary arrangement. It is the only viable framework through which unity and diversity can coexist.
But federalism is not self-executing. If managed through coercion, it will fragment. If nurtured through democratic practice, negotiation, and consensus, it can stabilize.
That is the choice facing Somalia today. Not whether to abandon federalism, but whether to finally make it work.
Mohamed Abdirizak Mohamud,
the former minister of foreign affairs of Somalia
