By Muhumed Haji Kaahin, a senior Prosperity Party member
of the Somalia Region
The Somali region, one of Ethiopia’s most resource-rich yet historically marginalized territories, has long been subjected to political manipulation and economic exploitation. Successive governments, from the days of the TPLF-controlled EPRDF to the current Prosperity Party, have treated the region as a cash cow, siphoning off its wealth while leaving its people in poverty and disenfranchisement.
While past regimes at least maintained some level of direct involvement, today’s system is controlled by the Kenni Cabal—a shadowy network of opportunists who have turned governance into a pure extraction scheme. The term “Kenni” comes from the Oromo word for “Give”, perfectly capturing the nature of this system: a hierarchy where survival is based on who can pay the most in bribes, favors, or financial contributions. Unlike previous power brokers who engaged in strategic manipulation, the Kenni Cabal operates with complete detachment, outsourcing governance to corrupt local actors while ensuring that money and resources flow upwards to sustain their patronage network.This has left the Somali region in an even deeper state of mismanagement, where political survival is no longer tied to public service but to maintaining financial contributions to external power brokers.
As someone who has witnessed the inner workings of the Somali Regional State, I can no longer remain silent. Corruption has been systematized, governance has been reduced to a self-enrichment scheme, and the people are left without a voice. From the embezzlement of security and drought relief funds to the neglect of basic infrastructure and services, the Somali region has suffered from chronic mismanagement and systemic corruption, leading to significant economic and political marginalization.
The Rise of the Kenni Cabal: A System of Extractive Patronage
The transition from TPLF corruption to the Kenni Cabal’s extractive rule has only deepened the Somali region’s suffering. Under the TPLF-led EPRDF, the region was subjected to a heavy military presence, justified by the ongoing insurgency. The army’s role, however, extended beyond security—it was a tool of repression, silencing dissent, looting resources, and ensuring the region remained subservient to Addis Ababa. Figures like Abay Tsehaye, a key TPLF power broker, controlled the region’s wealth, his name even becoming a colloquial Somali term, “Sahay” (meaning provision), mocking how he and his network siphoned resources while pretending to provide for the people. Corruption was rampant, but at least some governance existed to maintain control.
With the insurgency no longer a major threat, one would expect governance to improve. Instead, the Kenni Cabal has replaced military repression with financial extortion. Unlike the TPLF, which intervened in governance, the Kenni Cabal operates with total detachment. As long as money flows upward, they remain indifferent to the region’s fate. Mustafe, rather than governing, acts as a mere collection agent, ensuring financial contributions reach his external backers while neglecting public services.
This transition has made governance worse. Where the TPLF used force, the Kenni Cabal rules through bribery and patronage. In this system, political survival depends not on competence or service to the people but on one’s ability to funnel money upward—those who pay stay in power, while those who refuse are cast aside.
Governance in the Somali region is now transactional, dictated by bribes and loyalty payments. The Kenni Cabal’s only concern is securing wealth, leaving the Somali people trapped in an endless cycle of misrule. The legacy of oppression continues—only the method has changed.
The ‘Kenni’ Politics: The System That Shields Mustafe
The Somali region’s governance is no longer dictated by policy or public interest—it is controlled by Kenni politics, an entrenched system of bribery, patronage, and external manipulation orchestrated by the Kenni Cabal. This network ensures Mustafe remains in power, not through popular support, but by maintaining the financial flows that sustain his backers in Addis Ababa.
President Abdi Iley
To secure his position, Mustafe distributes money to key figures, grants land, and facilitates illicit trade networks. His elder brother, Mohamed, serves as his financial enforcer, ensuring that those shielding Mustafe continue receiving their share while keeping the money pipeline intact. This system has created a government where corruption is the norm, not the exception.
The scale of corruption is so widespread that even visiting federal ministers, directors, and their drivers routinely receive bribes—an open secret ignored at every level of government. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed himself once ridiculed Somali officials for their involvement in contraband dealings, fuel smuggling, and blatant corruption. Yet, despite his scathing remarks, no action was taken, reinforcing a system of impunity where looting continues unchecked.
While Mustafe’s survival is ensured through bribery and external protection, the direct consequence is total governance failure. Under previous administrations, Gimgema, an internal evaluation system, at least imposed some level of accountability. Today, even this minimal safeguard has been abandoned. There is no oversight, no punishment for stolen budgets, and no accountability for mismanagement.
The ultimate victims of Kenni politics are ordinary Somalis. Schools have no teachers, hospitals lack medicine, and families walk miles for water because funds meant for development have been stolen. Meanwhile, Mustafe and his allies continue to enrich themselves while ensuring external backers remain satisfied.
A regional official close to Mustafe once revealed the true nature of his rule, quoting him directly:
“The Amharas think I am one of them, so they will not betray me. But the OPP? They go to the highest bidder—they would sell their own for the right price.”
This sums up Kenni politics—a system built on deception, where loyalty is not earned but bought and sold to the highest payer. Mustafe’s survival depends not on governance or public service but on financial transactions that secure his protectors.
Even when the OPP attempted to remove him, powerful Amhara officials intervened—not out of loyalty, but because he remained useful to their interests.
From One Master to Another: The Imposition of Mustafe’s Rule
In 1849, the French writer Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr penned the phrase “plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose,” meaning “the more things change, the more they stay the same.” This perfectly captures power transitions in the Somali region.
When Abdi Iley was removed, many Somalis hoped for change. Instead, Mustafe was imposed, mirroring past manipulations. There was no consultation, no transparency, and no effort to foster regional self-determination. His loyalty was not to his constituents but to the power brokers in Addis Ababa who handpicked him
Under the EPRDF, TPLF officials dictated Somali affairs. Today, that role has shifted to the Oromo Prosperity Party (OPP), ensuring Mustafe remains a compliant figurehead. Unlike Abdi Iley, who, despite being a butcher and killer, kept most corruption within the region, Mustafe and his allies lack any sense of ownership. Instead, they flood stolen money into offshore banks and real estate ventures in Dubai, Istanbul, and Nairobi, abandoning the region entirely.
In a private discussion, a regional official close to Mustafe exposed his reliance on external protectors, recalling his own admission:
“I have secured my position by making myself indispensable to Addis Ababa. The Amharas shield me because they see me as one of their own, and the Oromos tolerate me because I pay them.”
These words reveal the essence of Mustafe’s rule—he does not govern for the Somali people, nor does he seek their approval. His political survival is engineered through bribery and external alliances, not leadership or legitimacy. Unlike Abdi Iley, who at least kept most of the corruption within the region, Mustafe’s loyalties are entirely external—he siphons wealth out of the Somali region, ensuring his financial backers remain satisfied while the people suffer.
The system remains the same—only the method of looting has changed.
Read more: Ethiopia’s Cash Cow: The Kenni Cabal Draining the Somali Region
Muhumed Haji Kaahin, a senior Prosperity Party member
of the Somalia Region
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State Decay: The case of Ethiopia and the Somali demand for self-determination By Faisal Roble
Somali State and the Curse of oppression: Has the plight Deteriorated? By Ahmed Abdidool
