Understanding the Clan Factor
With its open-ended segmentary system, the clan is an enduring political tool in Somali society. The elite uses the clan factor to bargain for power, thus inadvertently hindering the process of state construction. The bondage to the mighty genius Somali clanism by the average person and the absence of a civic-minded middle class make the clan factor central to politics, irrespective of the form of governance Somalis choose. Its grip never loosened.
Two schools of thought dominate our understanding of the pervasive role of the clan factor in Somali society. I.M. Lewis more than any scholar centered it as the main epistemological tool to analyze Somali society – thus “the I.M. Lewis School of Thought.” Said Samater, a rare scholar equipped with the triple backgrounds of pastoralism, Islamic Fiqi education, and a secular scholarship, affirmed Lewis’s take on the clan theory. Other scholars preferred the Marxist doctrine. This group, led by Hussein Adan, aka Hussein Tanzania, views it as a double-edged sword, recognizing its positive and negative aspects.
Sir Richar Burton, the 19th-century eccentric British traveler, detailed the segmentary nature of the clans he encountered as he had passed through the wheat prairie fields of Jigjiga en route to Harar. While a guest at the Garad Adan Garad Koshin court of the Geri clan, he peeked into the aspect of lineages and clan relations. For example, According to Sir. Burton, the Geri Garad was married to Ugas Doodi’s sister of the Samaron clan. On the other hand, Garad Adan’s sister was married to Garad Wiilwaal. Zaylac was ruled by Boqor Sharmarke of the Issaq who was a distant maternal uncle to Garad Adan. And always the Geri Garad must have a Hawiye mother, thus the Garad’s subclan is called “Bah-Hawiye.” These kinship relationships – just here used as an example – are prominently present in all Somali regions.
In passing, his expedition was sponsored by the pioneering colonial enterprise of the East Indian Company and the British Geographic Society to report on the culture and geography of Somalis to inform the colonial precursor in the name of the East India Company.
In recent years, colonial rulers and foreign interventionists also observed the grip the clan factor has on Somali society. For example, in the 1950s, during the runner-up to independence, the Italian colonial governor, Giovanni Fornari, was overwhelmed by the role clan sentiments played in state affairs. Nearly 50 years later, the commanding officer of UNISOM, Admiral Howe, equally talked about the degree to which clan was a forcible factor in the elite bargain over power. What is omitted by both colonial and interventionist powers is their determination to use the clan factor to divide and dismember the Somali nation.
However, adherence to Islamic values and occasional surge of patriotic feelings against foreign enemies can sometimes supersede clan divisions. Most Somalis will point at historical figures – Ahmed Gurey, Sayyid Mohemed Abdille Hassan, Sheikh Bashir, Sheikh Hassan Barsame, and Nassib Buundo, inter alia, who campaigned on Islamic and patriotic values succeeded in both scoring impressive victories as well as leaving behind virtues for the nation. Adam argues that the clan factor is a dialectical social unit and sometimes comes in handy to mobilize Somalis against outsiders. Most recent case studies include the largely successful patriotic project carried out by the Somali Youth League (SYL) and Somali National League (SNL) in the 1940s and 1950s. These two movements succeeded in uniting all Somalis in the Somali peninsula or in the Horn of Africa, creating the most consequential political movements in Somali history.
The spirit of these movements precipitated the unification of the two Somali regions under colonial rule (British Somali Protectorate and Italian Somaliland), subsequently leading to the 1960 Act of the Union thus the formation of the Somali Republic state. For a decade, a multiparty liberal democratic system thrived, until a military coup short-changed the process of state construction in 1969. President Mohammed Said Barre initially mobilized all Somali clans for the 1977-78 Ethio-Somali War, aka the Ogaden War (Adam, 1984).
The clan factor is also employed as a tool for conflict resolution. For example, the late Ahmed Mohamoud Silanyo’s administration succeeded in 2012 in resolving a deadly conflict between two clans in Daroor, located in the Somali region of Ethiopia. Recognizing Ethiopia’s inability or with its sinister attitude towards Somalis, thus not having any interest in reconciling two warring Somali clans, Sillanyo sent a high-level delegation and elders from Hargeisa and assembled clan leaders. Within days, he brought the two sides and successfully stopped the bloodletting. This is a case where utilizing the clan concept can help in conflict resolution (Roble, F, 2012).
Clan Identity vs. State Construction
Outside intra-clan rivalries, Somalis are united by identity. A Somali in Mogadishu is a brother to one in Jigjiga; one in Djibouti is a sister to one in Hargeisa, in Garowe, as well as in Garissa, Borama, or Barawa. Somalis use clans to identify their kin and kin. Externally, they use it to identify who is an outsider. Whereas internally it separates one’s clan members from neighboring settlements, It equally unites them in the enduring Somali identity against outsiders. What Somalis colloquially call “Somalinimo” or “Somaliness” is a political and identity construct.
The case of Somali identity is always strong when othering non-Somalis. A young lady in Haregia was scorned, for example, by some radical Somalilanders. She was a victim of no crimes except favoring Somalis from Puntland over aliens amongst them. By underlining her affinity with other Somalis despite the current political atmosphere, she said this: “Irrespective of political orientation or conflicts within, all Somalis share an identity, bloodline, and skin (“diir” in Somali which carries a deeper meaning than the English term of “skin”).
This identity-based unity is seen glaringly among the diverse diaspora communities too. In festivities, Somalis from all clans and regions together celebrate the gains and successes registered by all Somali regions. Also, in times of calamities, like the fire that consumed Haregiesa’s Weehaan marketplace, all Somalis joined the locals in the reconstruction project of the new Weehaan marketplace. During fund-raising for Weehaan, I asked my cousin who was one of the key organizers of the effort why he was doing the campaign. He told me that, besides himself being born in Hargeisa, “Weehaan was a Somali marketplace for all Somalis.”
Such a unity spirit does not always translate into unity for state construction. That is where one locates the thesis advanced by Samatar and Laitin that “Somalis are a nation in search of a state.” It is a nation of closely knit clans that ultimately form a large tree called “the Somali family.” In identity, they are one; however, in state construction, they remain challenged. The multiple political entities that one sees in the Somali peninsula, including those under Ethiopia, are an indication of the challenging task faced in state construction. And, the blame goes to the elite and foreign hands.
It is a challenge rooted in the inability of the elite to either tame the clan itself and minimize internal division or find an alternative way to construct a modern and viable unified national state. It is here where one must remember that the very elite that responded to Barre’s call in the 1977-78 war to liberate the Ogaden Somali region turned its guns back at him by organizing separate clan movements (SNM, SSDF, SUC, SPM, RNM, SNF, USP) to the detriment of the first Somali republic. While these movements were reformists in seeking change, their method was informed by the parochial confines of the clan factor. To complicate matters more, the vestiges of the 1990 civil war including the unilateral secession of Somaliland wreaked havoc on the process of state construction.
Why did these movements opt for clan-based movements as their tool to fight an oppressive regime? One theory is that, unlike most post-independent African nations, Somalia was untouched by the positive sweeping “modernization” changes of the 1940s and 1950s that swept Sub-Saharan Africa. On Independence Day, for example, there were only a few college-educated Somalis (Gaildon, I, 2010). Another theory is that Somalis neglected the rule of Islam in state construction. This theory postulates its argument on the notion that all successful Somali projects hankered on Islamic guidance in the search for a viable Somali state.
Somalia’s already fragile ability for state construction is complicated by how its elite outsourced its internal trust and gave agency to neighboring and Gulf states. Forces outside the Somali society largely helped give the clan factor more agency than most Somalis would have liked. In that regard, foreign forces are part of the hindrance to state construction – an issue the Lewis school of thought ignored.
As of writing this essay, Somaliland has conducted a largely fair and transparent presidential election for the 6th Time. However, the absence of SSC-Khaatumo, which controls one-third of the original Somaliland geography, makes the issue of clan division inescapable. Given the magic of Somali reconciliation, one cannot entirely give up on the hope that a future form of reconciliation is possible. As much as the regime of Sayad Bare erred, so did the Bihi regime. The Somaliland that carried out the election and the SSC-Khatum that stood separate are tied in bloodline and identity, but divided by state construction. Add to this the divide between the FGS and two FMS of Puntland and Jubaland. All these divisions have both clan factors as well as ideological differences in state construction. The net result is, however, a process that requires serious introspection on Somali state construction.
Following the 1990s civil war, the country’s elite ventured into managing the pervasive clan factor by apportioning power on a system of 4.5 – giving equal representation to the four major clans and .5 to the oppressed groups. This formula was meant to be a temporary fix. It provides for equality among clans but continues to impede state construction since citizenship is overshadowed by the use of the clan factor for all things political. After more than 30 years of apportioning power on this formula, the clan sentiment is more pronounced and eroded the concept of meritocracy, thus further weakening state construction.
Concluding Remarks
The clan factor is central to Somali politics. Of the dominant theories, one centers on the clan factor while the other views it as a dynamic social factor to be utilized both for negative and positive goals. Both schools of thought focus in their analysis one or more aspects of the potency of the clan factor in politics and its negative implication for state construction. It is a convenient tool for the elite to grab power and for foreign forces to freely intervene in Somali affairs.
Somalis are caught between a rock and hard place as the tension of the journey of the “Somali nation in search of state” continues through multiple generations.
Faisal A. Roble
Email: [email protected]
———-
Faisal Roble, the former editor of WardheerNews portal is Principal City Planner and CEO for Racial Justice & Equity for the Planning Department, Los Angeles City.
__________________
Related articles
Tribalism and its challenges to state formation in Somalia By Dayib Sh. Ahmed
Tribute to the mighty genius of Somali clannism By Prof Said Samatar
The Culture of Politics: The Somali Experience By Faisal A Roble
We welcome the submission of all articles for possible publication on WardheerNews.com. WardheerNews will only consider articles sent exclusively. Please email your article today . Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of WardheerNews.
WardheerNew’s tolerance platform is engaging with diversity of opinion, political ideology and self-expression. Tolerance is a necessary ingredient for creativity and civility.Tolerance fuels tenacity and audacity.
WardheerNews waxay tixgelin gaara siinaysaa maqaaladaha sida gaarka ah loogu soo diro ee aan lagu daabicin goobo kale. Maqaalkani wuxuu ka turjumayaa aragtida Qoraaga loomana fasiran karo tan WardheerNews.
Copyright © 2024 WardheerNews, All rights reserved
